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YOUPEE v. BABBITT - THE INDIAN LAND
INHERITANCE PROBLEM REVISITED
Michelle M. Lindo*
There is no question ... that the right to pass on valuable
property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right.'
Introduction
Case Studies
Imagine owning a tract of land with your brother and sister. You and your
siblings do not own identifiable portions of the land. Although the tract may
be composed of three acres, you do not own any acre by yourself. The terms
of the ownership agreement require all three proprietors to concur on a course
of action for the land before the owners can use the land.
Even if you and your siblings are the best of friends, this arrangement is
bound to cause problems; it is just human nature to have differing opinions.
When problems arise over how to use the tract, you and your siblings may
wish to divide the land into smaller parcels and go your separate ways. Alas,
the agreement forbids you from partitioning and selling the land or any
portion of it.
Now add to the hypothetical your sister's three living children at her death.
These children each take one third of her share in the tract. At this point, the
original three owners have grown to five owners. If you thought coming to
an agreement with your siblings was difficult, imagine trying to come to a
consensus with your pesky niece and nephews about the wisest use for the
land.
Fast forward about ten years. You and your brother have followed your
sister to the pearly gates. You leave two living children. Your son who
predeceased you leaves three children. Your brother's four children survive
your brother. By this time, the original three owners have mushroomed to a
dozen, each' with varying amounts of interests in the tract. The owners still
may not alienate or partition the land. Trouble is beginning to brew, and it
will only get worse.
If the above scenario has not persuaded you that this is a nightmare
situation, imagine owning interests in a tract of three hundred twenty acres.
*J.D., 1997, University of Oklahoma College of Law, B.A., 1994, University of Oklahoma.
1. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987).
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Originally, the tract belonged to your great grandmother alone. She took the
land under an agreement similar to that in the above hypothetical scenario.'
In the seventy years since she received the land, your great grandmother
has died. In fact, nearly one hundred subsequent owners of the land have
died.- Today, you are one of one hundred eighty-three people with ownership
interests in that tract. Some of these owners hold interests of up to fifteen
percent of the total acreage in the tract 4 You hold a minute fraction of one
percent of the land. Are you enjoying the privilege of owning property yet?
Finally, imagine this situation repeating itself throughout six million acres of
land!
A parcel of land known as Tract 1305 presents an even worse example of
fractionation In the early 1980s, the forty acres of land known as Tract
1305 were worth eight thousand dollars total and reaped just over one
thousand dollars in rent annually. Four hundred thirty-nine people held
ownership interests in this parcel at that time No owner received over
eighty-five dollars in rent per year.' The owner of the smallest interest in the
tract received one penny every one hundred seventy-seven years!9 The federal
government spent more than twice the value of the land computing the rent
due each year.'
Overview
For centuries, Americans have dearly treasured the right to transfer one's
property, especially real property, to one's descendants." Although this right
is by no means absolute, courts closely scrutinize restrictions on transferring
land by testamentary means. Government has always had the authority to
regulate all types of land, but when it comes to Indian land, the government
seems to have special authority to regulate its use." Due to decades of land
2. KIRKE KICKINGBIRD & KAREN DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED MILLION ACRES 26 (1973).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 26-30.
5. Id. at 31. The tract just described is real. It is part of the Standing Rock Sioux
Reservation in South Dakota. The original allottee's name was Mahpiya, or Nancy Cloud. Id. at
26. The subsequent owners belonged to various bands and tribes. The number of owners of this
allotment and the sizes of their interests cited in this paper were current in 1959. Id. at 30.
Undoubtedly, the number of owners has increased since that time. Likewise, the size of each
interest has probably decreased. Even in 1959, the owners of some of the interests in the tract
were unknown. Id. The fractionation problem continues even today.
6. Hadel, 481 U.S, at 713 (citing M. LAwsON, HEIRSHIP: THE INDIAN AMOEBA (1982),
reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before the Senate Select Committee on Indian





11. Id. at 715.
12. FELIX COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW vii (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
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use restrictions, transferring Indian trust land presents a real problem for all
parties involved: the donors, the donees, the tribes, and the federal
government.'3
Over the past one hundred years, tracking the ownership of these trust
lands has turned into a logistical nightmare. As each generation of owners
dies and leaves portions of trust parcels to his or her descendants, the number
of concurrent owners grows exponentially. 4 To further complicate the
situation, the system of landholding is composed of undivided interests in the
land. Rather than each descendant individually owning a small part of each
tract of Indian trust land, every owner holds an undivided share of the whole
land tract. No owner possesses an identifiable part of the land. 5
This means that all owners must agree when a different use for the land
is sought by one owner. 6 Due to the problems created by multiple ownership
of undivided interests in Indian trust land, such land has sometimes been all
but abandoned. Today, much of this land is rented out, creating the further
problem for the federal government of computing the amount of rent due each
owner of the fractional interests." Sometimes, the cost of computing the rent
checks exceeds the amount of rent owed to the owners. In fact, the annual
administration costs for such fractionated parcels sometimes exceed the value
of the property itself!'"
Obviously, this complicated situation requires a solution. During the past
sixty years, Congress has often attempted to solve the problem of too many
owners of land with little income-producing value. Twice since 1987, the
federal courts have told Congress that these efforts at reforming the Indian
trust land system of inheritance are inadequate and unconstitutional.'9
This article first reviews the historical and legal contexts within which the
Indian trust land inheritance issue arises. Next, it examines one of the federal
court system's latest rulings on this issue through Youpee v. Babbitt, which
held unconstitutional the current law dealing with the inheritance issue.20
This article focuses on possible solutions to the Indian trust land fractionation
problem which pass constitutional scrutiny. Some solutions concentrate on
enhancing the productivity of trust land and reducing the administrative costs
associated with fractionated Indian land, while others emphasize methods for
preserving the rights of Indian trust land owners to pass land to their
1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
13. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715.
14. Id. at 712.
15. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir. 1984), affd, Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987).
16. Kickingbird & Ducheneaux, supra note 2, at 31.
17. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715.
18. Id. at 713.
19. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-18; Youpee v. Babbitt, 117 S. Ct. 727, 734 (1997).
20. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. at 723-24.
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descendants. As this article will demonstrate, given the diverse actors
involv4d in the trust land situation, the fractionation problem is likely
intractable.
Historical and Legal Framework Behind Youpee
Provisions of the United States Constitution
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
federal government from depriving individuals of property without due
process of law.2 The government's obligation to provide the process that is
due to individuals includes such measures as holding hearings before taking
property. Simply giving prior notice of the government's planned actions may
constitute another means of affording due process to individuals. Additionally,
the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay the owners "just
compensation" when private property is taken for public use.' Attempts by
Congress to remedy this problem have violated the Fifth Amendment by
failing to compensate the owners of the land escheating to the tribes.'
General Allotment Act of 1887
The General Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA)' was the first piece of
comprehensive legislation in a long line of statutes dealing with Indian trust
land. 1he GAA divided Indian reservations into individual parcels.' To
protect against white settlers taking advantage of Indian land owners
unfamiliar with Anglo-American landholding schemes, the GAA provided
for the federal government to hold these lands in trust for the Indians.' If
the owner of a parcel of land died before the trust period ended, the federal
government held the land in trust for the deceased owner's heirs at law. These
heirs all held undivided interests in the land.' To this day, the government
holds millions of acres of land in trust for individual Indians."
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The pertinent phrases of the amendment read: "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" and "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
22. /d.
23. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-18; Youpee, 117 S. Ct. at 734.
24. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994)). This legislation is also known as the Dawes Act.
25. COHEN, supra note 12, at 131-32.
26. ld. at 131.
27. lId. at 472.
28. ickingbird & Ducheneaux, supra note 2, at 24.
29. COHEN, supra note 12, at 471 (stating that the government holds over fifty million acres




Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
Forty years after the implementation of the GAA provisions, undivided
interests in allotted land were held by many people? This increase in the
number of interest owners led to an increase in the government's
administration costs in dealing with the allotted lands. In response to this
growing problem, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
(IRA)3' to prevent the further allotment of Indian reservation lands to
individual tribal members. This act did nothing to combat the problem of the
many parcels of trust land already subject to fractionation.32 Any preexisting
allotment of land remained subject to multiple divisions upon the deaths of the
succeeding owners.
Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983
Nearly half a century after passing the IRA, Congress directly addressed
the problem of multiple owners inheriting small undivided interests in such
land. In the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 (ILCA),3 3 Congress tried
to do just what the act proclaimed, halt the further fractionation of Indian trust
land parcels by regulating the terms under which heirs of such owners
received property. As the rationales behind this move, Congress cited
reducing administrative costs and making the land more economically useful.
Another goal was to preserve the Indian land base.'
The ILCA provided for the escheat"5 of certain trust land to tribes when
an owner of Indian trust land died. The Act set out a number of qualifications
for determining whether the act applied to the trust land involved in a specific
case. First, the land must have been within the jurisdiction of a tribe?
Second, the Act took effect whether the deceased owner left a will or died
intestate. Third, the Act only applied to those owners who held two percent
30. Kickingbird & Ducheneaux, supra note 2, at 26.'
31. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(1994)).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994).
33. Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. I 1983) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994)). The original act provided that
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a
tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such interest represents
2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat.
Id.
34. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994).
35. Escheat is defined as "[a] reversion of property to the state in consequence of a want of
any individual competent to inherit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (6th ed. 1990).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994).
No. 1]
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or less of the total acreage of the tract at issue.3" Fourth, the land must have
yielded the deceased owner less than one hundred dollars in the year prior to
his or her death. If all these conditions were met, the decedent's trust land
escheat d to the decedent's tribe, rather than to the decedent's heirs or
devisees. In addition to having the land taken from them, neither the heirs nor
the decedent's estate received any compensation from the tribe or the federal
government.38 Naturally, potential heirs of small trust interest owners did not
welcome these provisions.
Hodel v. Irving (1987)
Potential heirs affected by the original ILCA challenged the act's
constitutionality in Hodel v. Irving.39 In Hodel, relatives of deceased Oglala
Sioux tribal members sued Secretary of Interior Donald Hodel, the federal
government's representative. The deceased tribal members' owned small
interests in a number of tracts of trust land.4 Chester Irving held two
undivided interests. Edgar Pumpkin Seed and Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed
owned thirteen trust lahd interests. Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross held
twice as many escheatable interests as did the Pumpkin Seeds.4
In Hodel, the decedents lost interests in land of varying worth.43 Chester
Irving's escheated interests were worth about one hundred dollars. The
Pumpkin Seeds and Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross lost interests worth
more substantial sums. Their trust interests were valued at approximately
eighteen hundred and twenty-seven hundred dollars, respectively."
The relatives of the deceased members claimed that the interests in the land
belonged to them, as the deceased owners' intended heirs or devisees." The
relatives of the deceased land owners claimed the federal government
unconstitutionally seized property that had belonged to the deceased tribal
members. The government had taken private property without providing
any compensation, much less "just" compensation, to the individual owners.
The Department of Interior claimed, to the contrary, that the relatives of
the previous owners did not own the land. Rather, the government asserted
37. lId
38. Id.
39. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 710 (1987).
40. The deceased tribal members included Chester Irving, Edgar Pumpkin Seed, Charles
Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross. Id. at 709.
41. Id. at 709-10.
42. Id.
43. Id. The amounts cited here are the values of the land interests themselves, not the rental
income of the property. Id.
44. Id
45. Id. at 711. Chester Irving, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed died
intestate. Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross died testate. Id,
46. Id at 704.
228 [Vol. 22
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that the fractional interests in dispute were governed by the original ILCA.
Under the provisions of the act, the government claimed that the land interests
at issue in Hodel met the qualifications necessary for the land to escheat to
the Oglala Sioux Tribe' First, the interests had not produced over one
hundred dollars in rent for their owners in the last year of the owners' lives.
Second, the interests did not amount to more than two percent of the total
acreage of the tracts of land in which the interests were situated' As far as
the Department of Interior was concerned, this was exactly the situation the
ILCA was intended to remedy. Underlying the Secretary of Interior's
argument was the philosophy that small interests in unprofitable land were to
be put to more practical and profitable use, such as having the land escheat
to the tribe.4
District Court Decision
The saga began in federal district court in South Dakota.'" The district
court sided with the government, proclaiming the ILCA constitutional. The
district court deferred to Congress on the inheritance question, stating that the
Indian land inheritance issue was within Congress' authority. Congress had
complete power to abrogate the ability of Indian land owners to pass their
land to others upon their deaths.5 In addition, the court concluded that the
relatives lacked vested interests in the escheated lands during the decedents'
lifetimes.'
Appellate Court Decision
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court and
reversed the lower court's decision. 3 The court of appeals found that the
ILCA violated the rights of the decedents. While the court held that the
plaintiffs had no vested rights in the trust land, ' the decedents did have such
interests. The plaintiffs could pursue these rights for their dead relatives. The
right to testamentary disposition of the decedents' property came from the old
Sioux allotment statute, the appeals court noted.5 This controversy
eventually found its way to the United States Supreme Court.
47. Id. at 714..
48. Id. at 710.
49. d. at 712.
50. Id. at 710. At the time of the filing of the original suit, the Secretary of Interior was
William P. Clark. By the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, Donald Hodel
had replaced Clark as Secretary of Interior.
51. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710.
52. Id.
53. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir. 1984), ajfd, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
54. Id. at 1263.
55. Id. at 1268-69.
No. 1] NOTES
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Supreme Court Decision
In an opinion that sparked no dissent,' the Court agreed with the
substantive arguments of the Indian trust land owners' relatives" and held the
original version of section 207 of the ILCA unconstitutional." While
acknowledging Congress' wide-ranging powers in the area of land regulation,
the Court held that section 207 of the ILCA went too far. The Court
borrowed from its takings analysis in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York Ci., 9 which distinguished mere regulation of property from a taking
of property. Mere regulation requires no compensation to the landowner,
while a taking requires "just compensation" to the landowner.'
The takings inquiry asks several questions. First, what is the economic
impact of the regulation?'" Second, what is the character of the government's
action?" Third, to what extent does the statute interfere with the owners'
reasonable investment-backed expectations?'
In applying these questions to Hodel, the Court found strong evidence in
favor of the plaintiffs' rights in the first two prongs of the takings analysis.
Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]here is no question that the relative economic
impact of Section 207 upon the owners of these property rights can be
56. Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Stevens wrote concurrences. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718-34.
57. Id at 711-12. Before making their substantive argument, the relatives successfully
persuaded the United States Supreme Court that the potential heirs did, indeed, have standing to
bring their suit. First, the Court held that an actual case or controversy existed, thus satisfying
the jurisdictional requirement. Id. Second, the plaintiffs suffered adequate injury-in-fact because
the Indian Land Consolidation Act divested the plaintiffs of land they would have inherited but
for the act'e application. The prerequisite that plaintiffs assert their own rights proved another
hurdle for the plaintiffs to clear. Id. Eileen Bissonette, Mary Irving, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed
argued not for their right to inherit but for the right of their deceased relatives to transfer property
at death. The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs on this point, also. Id.
A unique situation presented itself here. The Court held that a party's representative may
pursue the party's claim after the party's death. Id. Generally, the Secretary of Interior serves as
the deceased party's representative in cases involving Indian trust land, but, in the Hodel situation,
the Secretary of Interior also had the duty to enforce the statute the plaintiffs challenged.
Obviously, serving in both capacities would have been a blatant conflict of interest for Donald
Hodel. Therefore, the Court allowed the relatives of the deceased trust land owners to bring suit
in this controversy. Id.
58. Id. at 717-18.
59. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-27 (1978).
60. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 714-15.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Ruckelshads v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-05
(1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981);




substantial."' The Court criticized section 207 for conditioning the escheat
provision on the amount of rent the fractional interests had yielded, rather
than the value of the land itself. Under the terms of the original ILCA,
property worth thousands of dollars would escheat to the tribe of the deceased
owner if the property did not produce rent exceeding one hundred dollars a
year.' Indeed, the income provision seems somewhat strange when one
realizes that the owner who put the land to personal use most likely would not
have received any money for the land in the preceding year. The Court noted
that the land held value not only for its current life estate" owners but also
for the holders of the remainder interests in the land.' If the owner of a life
estate in a parcel was elderly, the remaindermen" owned quite a valuable
stake in the parcel. 9
In Hodel, the decedents held the life estate interests in the property, and the
plaintiffs held the remainder interests in the land. As originally enacted,
section 207 of the ILCA, 0 in effect, cut off the interests of the remaindermen
without providing any compensation for the seized interests. Therefore, the
Court deemed the escheat of these valuable interests as having a significant
economic impact on the owners, a sign of a taking."
The character of the government action involved in Hodel also indicated
that a taking of the Indian trust land had occurred. Justice O'Connor described
the regulation as "extraordinary.' She wrote
[t]he regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the
right to pass on a certain type of property - the small undivided
interest - to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass
on property - to one's family in particular - has been part of
the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.'
64. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 714.
65. Id.
66. A life estate is a property term defined as "an estate whose duration is limited to the life
of the party holding it, or some other person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 924 (6th ed. 1990).
67. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715.
68. A remainderman is defined as "[o]ne who is entitled to the remainder of the estate after
a particular estate carved out of it has expired." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1990).
A remainderman holds a present right to use the property in the future.
69. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(0 (Table A) (1986)). For example,
holding a remainder interest in a piece of property currently held by an eighty year old life tenant
would be much more valuable than a remainder interest in property held by a twenty year old life
tenant. In the latter scenario, the remainderman will likely have to wait decades before he or she
will have access to the property. The remainderman in the former scenario is in a better position
to have access to the property after the passage of only a few years.
70. 25 U.S.C § 2206 (1994).
71. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717.
72. Id. at 716.
73. Id. It is ironic that so many times the Anglo-American methods has worked against the
Indians, and yet, here, the Anglo-American system worked in the Indians' favor.
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The statute's effect was so pervasive the Court noted that "[e]ven the United
States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is
unprecedented 'and likely unconstitutional. ' In examining the escheat of
these valuable parcels of land, the Court found no viable alternative to
transferring the interests through devise or descent. The application of the act
in all instances, regardless of whether a will had been made, deeply troubled
the Court." The Court characterized section 207 as overbroad, possibly even
defeating inheritance plans which consolidated interests.7
Not all aspects of the statute weighed against its constitutionality, however.
The Court summarily dismissed the possibility that the ILCA interfered with
the trust land owners' investment-backed expectations.' Justice O'Connor
noted that the deceased owners did not buy the land at issue. The trust land
usually changed owners by gift at death. Successive owners received trust
land by operation of wills or intestacy statutes." Moreover, most of the
owners did not actually put the land to personal use; they rented the land out
to others. The government had held the land in trust for their use for a
century, so the trust terms were not new to the owners.'
One other factor favored the government's position in Hodel. The court
cited an "average reciprocity of advantage."" Justice O'Connor noted that
many owners of trust land subject to escheat belonged to the tribes to which
the land would escheat. The court explained that the benefits the owners
would derive from the escheat of many small interests would exceed the
hardship of continuing to hold the land in unproductive, fractionated
parcels.8
Hodel has not been universally accepted. Some commentators have written
off Hodel as an aberration in the course of land regulation policy. 2 Others
have warned that Hodel bodes ill for future takings cases unrelated to the
Indian inheritance issue.' A recent federal court case suggests that the
74. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716.
75. Id. at 716-18.
76. Id. at 718. The court was concerned that the original Indian Land Consolidation Act
would defeat the wishes of a decedent whose devisees already owned other interests in the tract
of land in which the decedent had held interests. If the decedent's intent was followed, the tract
would end up with fewer total owners. Id.




81. Id. at 715-16.
82. See Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally
Protected? - The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1195 (1995); Suzanne S.
Schmid, Escheat of Indian Land as a Fifth Amendment Taking in Hodel v. Irving: A New
Approach to Inheritance?, 43 U. MIAMi L. REv. 739, 756-59 (1989).
83. See John H. Leayitt, Note, Hodel v. Irving: The Supreme Court's Emerging Takings
Analysis -A Question of How Many Pumpkin Seeds Per Acre, 18 ENVTL L. 597 (1988); Schmid,
[Vol. 22
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Indian trust land inheritance issue is not yet dead, and Hodel may not be so
easily dismissed by future commentators and courts.'
Amended Indian Land Consolidation Act
In Hodel, the Supreme Court and the lower courts examined the original
version of section 207 of the ILCA.' While the Hodel case was moving
through the federal court system, Congress modified the conditions under
which Indian trust land would escheat to the tribes having authority over the
land. Congress amended section 207 of the ILCA.' In hindsight, as the
following discussion will highlight, Congress probably should have waited
until Hodel was decided before attempting to correct the deficiencies of the
act.
Under the amended section 207 of the ILCA, some provisions did not
change between the original and the amended versions. Small undivided
interests in Indian trust land could still escheat to the tribes. The escheat
provision applied to both descent and devise of the interests.' The size
requirement for the provision to apply remained two percent or less of the
supra note 82, at 752.
84. Klauser v. Babbitt, 918 F. Supp. 274, 280-81 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
85. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710-18; Irving, 758 F.2d at 1269. In dicta, the Irving court also
declared the amended version of the Indian Land Consolidation Act unconstitutional. Irving, 758
F.2d at 1269.
86. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994) [hereinafter Amended Indian Land Consolidation Act]. The
amended statute read:
(a) No undivided interest held by a member or nonmember Indian in any tract
of trust land or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or outside of a
reservation and subject to such tribe's jurisdiction shall descend by intestacy or
devise but shall escheat to the recognized tribal government, or if outside of a
reservation, to the recognized tribal government possessing jurisdiction over the
land if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such
tract and is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years from the date
of decedent's death. Where the fractional interest has earned to its owner less than
$100 in any one of the five years before the decedents death, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that such interest is incapable of earning $100 in any one
of the five years following the death of the decedent.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the devise of such an eseheatable
fractional interest to any other owner of an undivided fractional interest in such
parcel or tract of trust or restricted land.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any Indian
tribe may, subject to the approval of the Secretary, adopt its own code of laws to
govern the disposition of interests that are escheatable under this section, and such
codes or laws shall take precedence over the escheat provisions of subsection (a)
of this section, provided, the Secretary shall not approve any code or law that fails
to accomplish the purpose of preventing further descent or fractionation of such
escheatable interests.
Id.
87. Id. § 2206(a).
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total acreage of the tract under scrutiny. No compensation of any kind was
provided to owners who lost interests in land under the application of the
statute.s
Instead of looking back only one year in determining whether the land was
profitable, the amended section of the RLCA looked back through five years
of records to see whether the land yielded one hundred dollars or more in rent
in any of those years.' This change in the statute came partially as a result
of evidence that some trust land produced income only once every few years,
due to crop rotation or infrequent extraction of minerals from the land.
The new statute encouraged consolidation of land by exempting certain
interests from the danger of escheatO The original act did not provide such
safeguards. Under the amended statute, if the intended recipient of an
undivided interest in trust land already owned other undivided interests in the
same tract, the intended recipient could take the land. This escape hatch
opened only if the intended new owner received the property through a will.
If no will existed, the intended owner did not take the property through
intestacy even if he already owned other interests in the same tract.'
However, this well-intentioned addition to the statute was unlikely to apply
in many situations'
A final innovation in the amended section 207 of the RLCA allowed the
individual tribes to bypass the act by instituting their own methods of
controlling the further fractionation of allotted trust land." The Secretary of
Interior had to approve all such tribal land plans. Of course, any escheat
scheme did not please many trust land owners," so the updated version of
the ILCA had not been received with overwhelming enthusiasm.
Case Examination: Youpee v. Babbitt
The most recent case to deal with the Indian trust land escheat problem
was Youpee v. Babbitt. This case came from Montana in the Ninth Circuit.
The plaintiffs in this case were similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Hodel v.




90. Youpee v. Babbitt, 857 F. Supp. 760, 762 (D. Mont. 1994), affd, 67 F.3d 194 (9th Cir.
1995), affd, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997).
91. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(b) (1994).
92. Id.
93. Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d at 194, 198 (9th Cir. 1995), affd, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997).
94. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(c) (1994).
95. Not all Indians oppose Congress' efforts to consolidate fractionated trust land. In fact,
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe appeared as arnicus curiae on behalf of the government in
Hodel. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712 (1987).
96. Id. at 709-10.
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Allen Youpee, Cary Youpee, Darlan Youpee, Marvin Youpee, Sr., Helen
Youpee-Ricker, and Williamette Bussard were the devisees of William
Youpee, a Sioux and Assiniboine tribal member who owned Indian trust land
interests before his death in 1990. These undivided interests in the Devil's
Lake, Fort Peck, and Standing Rock Sioux reservations fell within the scope
of the amended version of the ILCA, according to the administrative law
judge assigned to the estate.' The controversy reached the federal court
system after the Department of Interior Board of Indian Appeals rejected the
claims of William Youpee's devisees. This board found the constitutional
question beyond the scope of its jurisdiction, leaving the devisees without an
administrative remedy 8
The plaintiffs claimed that the escheat method set forth in the amended act
fell short of constitutional standards and, therefore, constituted an unlawful
taking of the allotted trust land of William Youpee. As the decedent's
relatives, the plaintiffs sought to represent the decedent's interests in court.
The land at issue in Youpee was similar to the land seized in the Hodel
situation, the plaintiffs claimed. The testamentary transfer of Indian trust land
remained completely abrogated under the amended ILCAY' The plaintiffs
argued that the Interior Department took the land without providing any
compensation, a violation of the United States Constitution. In addition, the
lack of notice to William Youpee of the impending escheat of his land
especially troubled his heirs."
In defense of its position, the government pointed to the Hodel court's
concerns about the original statute defeating testamentary transfers of allotted
fractional interests that actually consolidated the land into fewer hands.''
The government asserted that the deficiency had been rectified in the amended
version of the act. Devise of fractional interests in property was no longer
completely abrogated. Only the qualifications of the new owners were
restricted by the amended act, the Department of Interior claimed." 2 The
land involved in the instant case was subject to escheat for several
reasons." The interests totaled a small fraction of the tracts on which they
were located, they had not produced sufficient rent in the previous five years,
and the devisees did not already own other interests in the tracts at issue.'"'
97. Youpee v. Babbitt, 857 F. Supp. 760, 763-64 (D. Mont. 1994), affd 67 F.3d 194 (9th
Cir. 1995), affd, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 762.
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District Court Decision
In reaching its decision, the United States District Court"os in Montana
relied on the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Hodel v. Irving. Based
on the same grounds cited in Hodel, the federal court found the descendants
of William Youpee had standing to challenge the validity of the statute. The
court held that the GAA gave trust land owners the vested right to dispose of
their undivided interests in land upon their deaths."° The plaintiffs, as third-
party claimants, could pursue the claim of their relative, William Youpee. In
addition, as in Ijodel, the plaintiffs in Youpee would have received the land
if the statute did not apply, satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement to bring
a claim."1 For the above reasons, the district court not 'only upheld the
claims of William Youpee's devisees, but also granted the devisees summary,
judgment in the case."
The district court found little substantive difference between the original
and amended versions of the RLCA. The court discounted the government's
claims that the ability to devise fractional trust interests was restored in the
amended statute." People who make wills tend to leave their property to
lineal descendants, if they have any. The plaintiffs successfully argued that
few, if any, lineal descendants of trust land owners were likely to hold other
interests in the same tract of land. Therefore, the district court found the
applicability of this exception to the escheat provision to be limited."'
This limited exception to the escheat provision weighed heavily in the
district court's decision in Youpee. The court held that
for those property owners who are not legally capable of devising
property, or for those like William Youpee, who do not have an
heir who possesses an undivided interest in the escheatable
property, the statute, as amended, continues to allow the total
abolition of both descent and devise of such property."'
The court held that the bar on transferring fractional undivided interests
required compensation to the owners. Since such compensation did not appear
in the ELCA, the district court relegated the amended version of the act to the
same fate as the original version - unconstitutional."2
105. The Hon. Jack Shanstrom presided.
106. Youpee, 857 F. Supp. at 762.
107. Id. at 764.
108. Id. at 766.
109. Id. at 765.
110. Id.
111. Id.





The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided the constitutional claim
in Youpee. The Ninth Circuit"' agreed with the holding of the trial court in
Youpee and held that the amended section 207 of the LCA fell short of the
constitutional requirements spelled out in Hodel."4
After briefly reviewing the history of Indian trust land policies, the court
outlined the provisions of amended section 207 of the LCA. The appeals
court noted that the new version of the statute at issue in Youpee provided
more flexibility than the original version. Tribes were allowed to craft their
own solutions to the fractionation problem under the amended statute.'
Also, the statute only applied to land that had been consistently unproductive.
More importantly, the amended measure affected a more limited class of
landowners."6
As in Hodel, the Ninth Circuit examined the amended provision in light of
the regulation/takings analysis. The court found close parallels between Hodel
and Youpee on the economic impact prong of the test."7 The Ninth Circuit
followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in declaring the value of the land at
issue, rather than solely the land's rental income, as the important factor here.
The respective values of the interests subject to escheat in Hodel and Youpee
were comparable, the court noted. Given the Supreme Court's finding that the
values of the interests in Hodel were not minimal, it is not surprising that the
Ninth Circuit found the interests in Youpee to be substantial, as well."'
Thus, the court held that the loss of such interests would have a significant
economic impact on the owner.
The appeals court deemed the nature of the government's regulation of the
land to be the most important factor in deciding whether a taking had resulted.
The court appreciated the looming problem of Indian trust land inheritance
and Congress' ongoing efforts to control this situation."' Despite this, the
court criticized the amended section 207 for severely limiting the choices of
trust land owners. The new act allowed only a select group of people to
inherit fractionated trust land. As the plaintiffs in Youpee pointed out, the
designated beneficiaries are unlikely to be lineal descendants of the owner.
Rather than limiting the number of or means by which descendants could take
land, the statute went too far in prescribing requirements for who could take
the land. The court found the limited applicability of the exception
113. Circuit Judge Beezer presided.
114. Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194, 200 (9th Cir. 1995). affid, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997).
115. Id. at 197.
116. Id.
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amounted to a total abrogation of the rights of owners to transfer their land
by descent and devise. Due to this deficiency, the court held the amended
provision of the ILCA violated the United States Constitution by taking land
without providing compensation to the owners.'
As in Hodel, the court also found William Youpee's investment-backed
expectations lacking. Due to the use of the land for lease purposes, the court
held that the decedent did not have investment-backed interests in the
property.' However, it is not necessary that a statute satisfy all the prongs
of the test for a taking to occur." Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held the
amended ILCA unconstitutional, and William Youpee's land did not escheat
to the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes."
Supreme Court Decision
While the United States Supreme Court ruling in Hodel binds all the
nation's courts, only courts in the Ninth Circuit had to follow the appellate
decision in Youpee. In March 1996, Youpee was cited in the Wisconsin
federal district court case of Klauser v. Babbitt." In Klauser, a case with
facts similar to both Hodel and Youpee, the district court declined to follow
the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Youpee.'"
The United States Supreme Court resolved this disparity by reviewing the
Youpee case.2  The Court noted that William Youpee had devised each of
his interests to an individual descendant, rather than further splitting each
interest by giving them to all descendants together." Relying on Hodel and
the Ninth Circuit analysis of Youpee, the Court held the amended ILCA did
not correct the problems in the original LCA. In an 8-1 decision,' the
Court struck down the amended § 207 of the ILCA.3"
121. Id. at 200.
122. Id. at 199.
123. Id. at 199-200.
124. rd. at 200.
125. Klauser v. Babbitt, 918 F. Supp. 274 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
126. The Klauser court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's finding that the amended Section
207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act totally abrogated the right to transfer fractionated
Indian trust land upon the owner's death. The Wisconsin court cited the amended statutes
provision allowing the devise of fractionated interests to an individual who already owned
interests in the same tract of land as one example which negated the "total abrogation" argument.
The longer review period required before land would escheat was another factor favoring the
constitutionality of the amended statute. Id. at 280-81.
The Klauser court criticized the Hodel decision, also. In Klauser, the court deemed the Hodel
holding "a departure from its approach in earlier cases that heirs are not injured by changes in
the laws of descent and devise that take effect before the death of the property owner." Id. at 277.
127. Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997).
128. Id. at 732.
129. Id. at 729. Justice Stevens dissented.
130. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. at 734.
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The Court based its decision on five factors. First, the amended section
still ignored the value of the property itself and focused solely on the income
derived from the property.' Second, the right to give one's property away
at death was strictly limited by the narrow class of persons who could receive
the property under the statute.' Third, the statute continued to restrict the
right to devise property even when property interests would be consolidated
as a result of the transfer. Fourth, the Court rejected the Interior
Department's arguments that the amended LCA did not interfere with
William Youpee's right to use the property and that other means of
transferring the property were available.'" Finally, the provision of the
amended section allowing tribal codes to deal with the escheatable interests
did not affect the case because no such codes had been enacted at the time
Youpee reached the high court. 3S
Analysis: Where Should Congress Go from Here?
Despite the courts striking down congressional attempts to resolve the trust
land fractionation problem, the courts in both Hodel and Youpee
acknowledged that finding a viable solution to the problem was a laudable
goal." At first glance, the possible solutions to the Indian trust land
inheritance problem appear endless. However, after a more critical
examination of the possibilities, some solutions appear unlikely to ease the
tension of this problem. Fortunately, other possible cures for the fractionated
Indian trust land ailment appear more promising.
Government Condemnation
The first method by which the government might try to remedy the
fractionation problem would be to condemn the trust land. The government
could strip the fractionated interest owners of their small stakes in various
trust land tracts and take title to all interests in the land through the
government's eminent domain powers. The Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution allows the government to take private property for public
use.3  The plaintiffs in Youpee would receive money instead of interests in





135. Id. at 733-34.
136. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712 (1987); Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194, 199 (9th
Cir. 1995), afd, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997).
137. Fortunately for the federal government, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
"public use" quite expansively. See generally Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 465 U.S.
1097 (1984) (upholding government taking of landlords' property for the benefit of tenants
because entire state owned by a limited number of people).
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government condemns private land in order to further the public good, the
Constitution requires the government to compensate the land owner for his or
her loss."3 The government might prefer to pay for the land once, rather
than spending more than the value of the land each year on administration
costs.
This method of eliminating minute interests in Indian trust land has some
major drawbacks. First, the government is unlikely to jump at the opportunity
to own more land. What use will the government have for thousands of acres
of farmland? Will the land be allowed to lay dormant if the government takes
the land? The prospect of spending thousands of dollars of taxpayer money
for land the government does not need might not sit well with fiscally
conservative members of Congress or the public.139 Also, condemnation of
the land would not protect the Indian land base."4
In addition, the suspicion such government action might provoke from the
Indian landowners themselves could stifle any condemnation program. The
relationship between the individual Indian tribes and the federal government
has been marked by a historical pattern of the government promising land to
the Indians and later taking this land from them. This solution to the
fractionation problem might leave a bitter taste in the mouths of Indians who
have learned the lessons of history.
Restrict All Descent
Restrirting all descent of fractionated land is another possible congressional
remedy for the trust land inheritance problem. 4' In both Hodel and Youpee,
the courts repeatedly criticized the total abrogation of the right to transfer
property upon death through will and by operation of intestacy statutes. The
courts proclaimed that a statute which only restricted the intestate transfer of
land might not be so objectionable. While the courts might frown on a
statute that defeats a decedent's explicit intent, the courts are more likely to
uphold a scheme that affects only individuals who never took any action to
safeguard their interests. Therefore, a provision that prevented fractionated
interests from passing to individual tribal members through intestacy and
provided for the interests to escheat to the tribes would likely be
constitutional.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139. Of course, in the long run, this might be better than spending more than the value of
the property on administration each year.
140. Perhaps the federal government could return the condemned land to the tribes, but such
a scheme has an effect similar to that of the amended Indian Land Consolidation Act, which heirs
of individual landowners have so vigorously opposed.
141. "Descent" and "intestacy" refer to property that is transferred without the writing of a
will.
142. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718; Youpee, 67 F.3d at 199.
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The constitutionality of a statute restricting all descent does not guarantee
that such a solution would operate without problems. Many of the interests
at stake in Hodel would still be lost to the tribe because the decedents
neglected to write wills. Heirs would still view the statute as another
justification for the government to take their land.
Tie Escheat to Land Value
Congress could remedy the defects of tying the escheat of tiny trust land
interests to the amount of rent yielded from the parcel. While the courts in
Hodel and Youpee agonized over the rent provision, they appeared to approve
of a scheme that would allow the escheat of such land based on other
criteria.43 One such criterion might include tying the escheat provision to
the value of the land itself, rather than the amount of money realized from the
use of the land. Again, the courts might require some sort of compensation
to the owners for their land. The escheat of land worth a negligible amount
might not pose a problem for the courts.
The federal government should welcome such a plan. This solution would
remedy the problem of too many owners of valueless parcels of land. Tying
the escheat of land to its value might also encourage voluntary consolidation
of fractionated land interests, thus satisfying an important goal of both
versions of the ILCA. Owners of small interests in tracts might seek to
increase their holdings in the tracts so that their interests do not escheat to
their tribes.
On the contrary, the Indian landowners might not like the fact that their
land, however unproductive it might be, is being forcefully taken from them.
Land that holds little monetary worth might hold significant religious or
personal value for the owners. Another deficiency of this scheme is the fact
that the government would still be faced with figuring the rents for
fractionated parcels of economically valuable land, such as the land involved
in Hodel and Youpee.
Designate Single Beneficiary
Mandating that the owners of fractionated trust land designate a single
beneficiary to take their land upon the owners' deaths would allow the land
to stay in the hands of individuals.'" These individual beneficiaries could
be lineal descendants of the previous proprietors, a possibility all but ruled out
under the current statute. In the case of intestacy, Congress could construct
a system whereby the land goes to the decedent's spouse first, then to the
eldest child, and so on, until a living relative is found.
This compromise solution to the trust land inheritance boondoggle offers
something for both sides of this controversy. This would help the government
143. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 71415; Youpee, 67 F.3d at 199.
144. Youpee, 67 F.3d at 199.
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in its rent computing function. Restricting the transfer of land to a single
beneficiary would not really further the consolidation purpose of the ILCA.
While the number of trust interest holders would likely not decrease under
such a scheme, the total number of trust interest holders would be guaranteed
not to climb any higher.
Landowners would retain the freedom to choose to whom to give their
land. Only the number of beneficiaries would be limited. William Youpee
would be able to keep his land interests within the control of his family under
such a scheme, rather than having his land escheat to the Sioux and
Assiniboine Tribes. However, allowing only one beneficiary to receive trust
land might precipitate many family quarrels over the issue of which individual
relative will take the land.
Swap Interests
Yet another possible resolution of the fractionation dilemma entails some
complicated maneuvers. Many Indian trust land owners hold interests in land
located in several different tracts. Some landowners even own interests in
separate reservations. This contributes to the logistical headache of
determining rents and control over the land. Swapping interests of similar
sizes and values might aid the situation.
For example, suppose that Heir A owns two interests worth one hundred
dollars each. These interests are located in two different tracts of trust land.
We will label these tracts as Blackacre and Whitefield. Suppose further that
Heir B owns four different interests worth fifty dollars each. Conveniently,
these interests, two per tract, are located in the same two tracts as Heir A's
interests.45 In the land swap, Heir A's interest in Blackacre would be
transferred to Heir B. In return, Heir A would receive Heir B's interests in
145. The hypothetical involves the following scenario:
Before the land exchange
Heir A Heir B
Blackacre I interest 2 interests
($100) ($50 each)
Whitefield I interest 2 interests
($100) ($50 each)
After the land exchange








Whitefield. This land trade would result in Heir A and Heir B owning land
of the same dollar value as before the swap.
The net benefit of the trade is the reduction in the total number of owners
of Blackacre and Whitefield. This would achieve the government objective
of consolidating ownership of the trust land parcels and avoid taking land
away from the owners without compensation. This could also save the
government thousands of dollars in administration expenses in the long run.
Obvious problems materialize with the suggestion of a land swap method
of reform. First, real property is considered unique and irreplaceable in
American society. Swapping interests of comparable value in two different
tracts would not appeal to a person attached to the characteristics of his
original piece of property. For example, Blackacre is fertile farmland with a
lake in the middle. Whitefield is a barren desert wasteland. Granted, the
uniqueness of the property might not pose a great concern for Indian trust
interest owners who do not personally use the land.
The paperwork involved presents another difficulty with the land trade
issue. This scheme requires evaluation of the land, finding owners of
comparably valued interests in reciprocal parcels, changing the deeds to reflect
the new ownership, and changing the rent computation percentages.
Fortunately, most of the work involved in the land swap process comes at the
beginning. After the land trade is completed, the paperwork is actually less
than before the swap took place. The problem of finding owners of interests
of comparable value may also be remedied by providing a cash supplement
to the owner of the more valuable interests transferred.
Transfer Responsibility for Land
The federal government's transfer of responsibility for computing the rents
due to owners of fractionated Indian land is one innovation which might
accelerate the consolidation of fractionated Indian land. The government could
simply stop spending scarce resources figuring out which interest holder is
owed a few pennies of rent per year. The responsibility for determining who
gets how much rent would fall to the tribes or the individual interest holders
themselves. As long as the federal government continues to pay for the
computation of rent for the fractionated land, owners of small interests in the
land have no incentive to consolidate their interests."
Shifting responsibility for keeping records of the owners and rents for
Indian trust land would appeal to the federal government. No longer would
the government be faced with the task of figuring out who owned what
percentage of a certain tract of trust land. The computing of rents on all those
thousands of interests in fractionated trust land would fall on different
shoulders. If the tribes were faced with the prospect of finding the money in
146. Leavitt, supra note 83, at 611 (citing FELUx COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 208-09 (Five Rings 1986) (reprint of Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942)).
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their limited budgets to compute the rents, the tribal members might be
prompted to implement a land consolidation plan of their own. Consolidation
would probably come sooner if the. individual interest holders had the task of
computing the rents. Owners of minute interests in land would likely realize
that it does not make good economic sense to spend ten dollars per year to
discover they are entitled to a dollar in rent.
The tribes and individual owners involved would probably not welcome the
plan to relieve the federal government's responsibility for keeping the records
for Indian trust land. The increased administrative costs would force some
land owners to abandon or consolidate interests they otherwise would have
retained under the current system. The result of such' a transfer of
responsibility might be a de facto taking of land, not a good solution.
Educate Owners
A possible addition to the present system of inheritance of fractional
interests in Indian trust land would bypass Congress completely. It involves
simple education of the landowners.47 As evidenced by the landowners in
Youpee, people who own land subject to escheat sometimes do not even know
about the provisions of the ILCA. 45 In a concurring opinion in Hodel,
Justice Stevens focused on this problem. He concentrated his analysis on the
lack of notice to owners who held land interests subject to escheat. He also
lamented the lack of any type of grace period before the land escheated to the
tribes.49
If owners of small trust land interests knew what would happen to their
land upon their deaths, perhaps the owners would take steps during their lives
to prevent the escheat of the land to the tribes." If owners knew of the
possibility that their land would escheat to their tribes and did not take steps
to remedy this situation, at least they would have received the notice required
by due process.
One probable result of better education about the consequences of the
ILCA is the creation of inter vivos trusts."' The act does not address the
147. Statement of Rebecca Adamson, President, First Nations Development Institute Before
the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, House Commnittee on
Government Operations: The Management of Indian Trust Funds, FED. NEWS SERv., Sept. 26,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, FNS File. Such education might come in the form of
well-publicized meetings held at tribal councils or town halls. Community centers and schools
might also provide a centralized place for land owners to learn of their rights to their property.
Even direct mailings of information would provide at least minimal notice to trust land interest
owners.
148. Youpee, 857 F. Supp. at 763.
149. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717, 728 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Some tribal members might actually want their property to go to their tribe.
151. An inter vivos trust allows one person to hold legal title to property that must be used
for the benefit of the person holding the equitable interest in the property. JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 568 (5th ed. 1995). For example, William
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transfer of interests through the use of such trusts. In Hodel and Youpee, the
courts noted the availability of inter vivos trusts to circumvent the statute's
restrictions." Trusts would allow the interest owners to remain in control
of the land during their lifetimes and transfer the land to the intended
descendants or other beneficiaries upon the owners' deaths.
Of course, this method defeats Congress' intentions behind the enactment
of the RLCA. A growing number of people would still own minute undivided
interests in trust land. Other drawbacks to the inter vivos trust solution
include the fact that trusts are not simple creations. They generally require an
attorney to help set up the arrangement. Also, they are expensive to maintain,
especially if the owner of an interest in trust land is fairly young when the
trust is established.15
Retain Status Quo
Congressional repeal of the RLCA, resulting in taking a "hands off' view
of the situation, is the final alternative to the fractionated land problem. On
the positive side, this is possibly the most favored solution for some trust
interest owners. The owners would not have to worry about following the
correct procedure to avoid the escheat of their land to their respective tribes.
This reform also avoids governmental responsibility for determining whether
land is valuable or productive.
For the Department of Interior, however, a laissez-faire attitude would
signal that the fractionation problem will only get worse as succeeding
generations take over the land of their ancestors. There would be no way to
halt the further fractionation of land that already yields merely pennies per
year to its owners. For the Indian owners themselves, the land would continue
to yield little income if allowed to remain in its present fractionated state.
William Youpee's devisees would continue to receive less than one hundred
dollars per year from their interests in the land they inherited.
Conclusion
In summary, fractionated Indian trust land presents a great problem for
society. The quagmire of small undivided interests in Indian land is a
complex, multi-sided issue with no easy solutions. Congress has the delicate
task of balancing the property rights of the trust land owners with the
Youpee could have set up an inter vivos trust which stated that William Youpee served as trustee
(with legal title to the land) for the benefit of his children, with the land being distributed to his
children upon Williams death.
Other alternatives that might result from increased education are holding property through
tenancy by the entirety (husband and wife own the property jointly) or through joint tenancy with
the right of survivorship (when one owner dies, the other owner automatically takes the property).
152. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717; Youpee, 857 F. Supp. at 763.
153. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 151, at 1006.
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economic practicalities of efficient land use and a federal government deep
in debt. Congress made some small improvements in the ILCA from its
original version, but the amended statute has a long way to go before it passes
constitutional muster. Whether Congress can deliver a constitutional statute
on this issue remains to be seen. This article has attempted to highlight some
of the possible roads Congress could explore in devising a solution to the
fractionated land problem. All the potential solutions present good and bad
alternatives for the government, the tribes, and the individuals involved.
Shifting the burden of administering the land to the individual owners might
be the best solution to the problem if the goal is to consolidate the land
without depriving the Indian owners of their land base. This solution, too, has
its share of drawbacks. One thing that is certain, though, is the fact that each
succeeding generation of trust land owners will result in the further
fractionation of the tracts of land if no viable solution surfaces soon.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/6
